Official Commemoration of the NATO Bombing of Serbia. A Case Study of the Fifteenth Anniversary by Mandić, Marija
Institute for East and 
Southeast European Studies
Institut für Ost- und 
Südosteuropaforschung
Volume 64 no. 4 2016
europa
Südost-
Memories and Narratives 
of the 1999 NATO  
Bombing in Serbia





JAGODA ROŠUL-GAJIĆ   





Journal of Politics and Society
Published on behalf of the Institute for East and Southeast European Studies, Regensburg 
Editors: 
SABINE RUTAR (Regensburg), Editor-in-Chief
GER DUIJZINGS (Regensburg)
WIM VAN MEURS (Nijmegen)
Editorial Board: 
Heinz-Jürgen Axt (Duisburg-Essen) 
Florian Bieber (Graz) 
Dimitar Bechev (Sofia/Oxford) 
Johanna Bockman (Washington, DC) 
Xavier Bougarel (Paris/Berlin) 
Ulf Brunnbauer (Regensburg) 
Marie-Janine Calic (München) 
Nina Caspersen (York) 
András Inotai (Budapest) 
Deema Kaneff (Birmingham)
Stef Jansen (Manchester) 
Jürgen Jerger (Regensburg) 
Denisa Kostovicova (London) 
Ivan Krastev (Sofia) 
Mladen Lazić (Belgrade) 
Joseph Marko (Graz/Bozen) 
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (Bukarest/Berlin) 
Vjeran Pavlaković (Rijeka) 
Nadège Ragaru (Paris) 
Sabrina P. Ramet (Trondheim) 
Solveig Richter (Erfurt) 






Wim van Meurs (Book Review Editor) 
Südosteuropa, volume 64, no. 4, 2016
C O N T E N T
MEMORIES AND NARRATIVES OF THE 1999 NATO BOMBING IN SERBIA
Orli Fridman and Krisztina Rácz: Memories and Narratives of the 1999  
NATO Bombing in Serbia. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433-437
Orli Fridman: Memories of the 1999 NATO Bombing in Belgrade, Serbia . . 438-459
Marija Mandić: Official Commemoration of the NATO Bombing of Serbia. 
A Case Study of the Fifteenth Anniversary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460-481
Srđan Atanasovski: ‘The Song Has Kept Us’: Soundscape of Belgrade  
during the NATO Bombing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482-499
Gruia Bădescu: ‘Achieved without Ambiguity?’ Memorializing Victimhood  
in Belgrade after the 1999 NATO Bombing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500-519
Krisztina Rácz: Trauma or Entertainment? Collective Memories of the  
NATO Bombing of Serbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 520-543
 
Jagoda Rošul-Gajić: Agents of Change. Women’s Advocacy during  
Democratization in Croatia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 544-559
TRAVELOGUE
#Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 560-573
BOOK REVIEWS 
Abram de Swaan, The Killing Compartments. The Mentality of Mass  
Murder (Ger Duijzings) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 574-576
Béatrice von Hirschhausen / Hannes Grandits / Claudia Kraft / Dietmar  
Müller / Thomas Serrier, Phantomgrenzen. Räume und Akteure in der  
Zeit neu denken (Sabine Rutar) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 576-580
Margit V. Wunsch Gaarmann, The War in Our Backyard. The Bosnia and  
Kosovo Wars through the Lens of the German Print Media (Stefan Ihrig)  580-582
Pål Kolstø, ed, Strategies of Symbolic Nation-Building in South Eastern  
Europe (Paul Reef) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 582-584
Marlene Spoerri, Engineering Revolution. The Paradox of Democracy  
Promotion in Serbia (Johanna K. Bockman) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584-586
Nevenka Tromp, Prosecuting Slobodan Milošević. The Unfinished Trial  
(Wim van Meurs)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 586-588
MARIJA MANDIĆ
Official Commemoration of the NATO Bombing of Serbia. 
A Case Study of the Fifteenth Anniversary
Abstract: This article analyses how NATO’s bombing of Serbia has been officially commemo-
rated in that country. Initially, it provides an overview of the commemorations performed 
between 2000 and 2013, covering both the commemorative practices and policies of leading 
Serbian politicians and alternative voices. The focus then turns to the fifteenth anniversary 
of the bombing in 2014. Just as in previous commemorations, there was no central ceremony, 
but, rather, a series of commemorative events held all over the country. The controversies 
that these aroused are then discussed, in particular those surrounding the commemoration 
of Radio Television Serbia’s employees and the spontaneous commemorative acts that took 
place in Serbian schools. 
Marija Mandić is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Acad-
emy of Sciences and Arts in Belgrade, and a Humboldt Postdoctoral Fellow (2016-2018) at 
the Institute for Slavic Studies at the Humboldt University, Berlin.
 
‘– How did the bombing affect you?
– Well, after it, and particularly after I experienced 
a three-ton bomb dropped on Straževica Hill in Bel-
grade, when I thought I was going to die, I decided to 
marry my long-term boyfriend.’ (From my conversation 
with Eve Ann Prentice, war correspondent for The Times)
Theoretical Framework:  
the Politics of Memory, Discourse, and Media
The connection between social groups and collective memory has been the 
starting point for memory research in the modern humanities ever since Mau-
rice Halbwachs argued that every memory is carried by a specific social group, 
limited in space and time.1 The politics of memory, however, is concerned with 
1  Maurice Halbwachs, La mémoire collective. Ouvrage posthume publié par Mme Jeanne 
Alexandre née Halbwachs, Paris 1950 [1925]; Alon Confino, Collective Memory and Cultural 
History. Problems of Method, The American Historical Review 102, no. 5 (1997), 1386-1403, 1392. 
Südosteuropa 64 (2016), no. 4, pp. 460-481
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the role politics has in shaping collective memory. It is reflected in the ways 
historical events are represented by politicians, talked about in government-
controlled media, or transmitted through the school system.2 The present article 
focuses specifically on commemoration as a form of remembrance. According 
to Assmann, cultural memory is memory which has periodically stabilized with 
the help of anniversaries and which can thus extend over a very long period. 
Commemoration is also an opportunity for collective re-staging: communities 
of memory make use of commemorations to represent themselves in the way 
they would like to see themselves—in the way they aspire to be.3 Paul Connerton 
stresses the interrelationship: 
‘If there is such a thing as social memory, I shall argue, we are likely to find it in 
commemorative ceremonies; but commemorative ceremonies prove to be com-
memorative only in so far as they are performative; performativity cannot be 
thought without a concept of habit; and habit cannot be thought without a notion 
of bodily automatisms.’4
As this article analyses commemorative ceremonies and discourses, I will out-
line the basic theoretical assumptions I have adopted. My understanding of 
‘discourse’ comes from Michael Foucault, who takes the rules of the formation 
of discourse to explain the ways in which societies and groups constitute forms 
of subjectivity, knowledge, social practices, institutions, and power relations, 
and vice versa.5 Since critical social theory maintains that discourse and society 
constitute one another, it criticizes the abuses of power that are reflected, con-
structed and legitimized via discourse.6 The concept of ‘discursive strategy’, 
which is also used in this article, denotes a more or less accurate plan adopted 
to achieve a certain political, psychological or other kind of objective.7
Theorizing about the social context in which a commemorative discourse has 
been produced brings us to a thorny question: could Serbia in the post-bombing 
period be described as a traumatized society? In existing academic writing, it 
2  Cf. Jan Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization. Writing, Remembrance, and 
Political Imagination, Cambridge 2011; Aleida Assmann, Arbeit am nationalen Gedächtnis. 
Eine kurze Geschichte der deutschen Bildungsidee, Frankfurt 1993; Aleida Assmann, Der 
lange Schatten der Vergangenheit, München 2006.
3  Assmann, Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit, 230.
4  Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember, Cambridge, New York 1989, 5.
5  Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language, New 
York 1972, 38.
6  Cf. Teun van Dijk, Critical Discourse Analysis, in: Deborah Tannen / Deborah Schiffrin / 
Heidi E. Hamilton, eds, Handbook of Discourse Analysis, Oxford 2001, 352-371; Norman 
Fairclough, Language and Power, London 1989; Norman Fairclough / Ruth Wodak, Critical 
Discourse Analysis, in: Teun van Dijk, ed, Discourse Studies. A Multidisciplinary Introduction, 
vol. 2: Discourse as Social Interaction, London 1997, 258-284. 
7  Ruth Wodak et al., The Discursive Construction of National Identity, Edinburgh 2009, 31.
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is problematized whether the bombings created a collective trauma or not.8 
I argue that the NATO bombings caused a specific, though suppressed, national 
trauma. When using the term ‘national trauma’, I take its definition to be a cri-
sis, specific event, or large-scale disaster which has a traumatic impact on the 
national community, and which is eventually engraved in collective memory 
at the official and vernacular levels.9 According to Bernhard Giesen, triumph 
and trauma represent opposite poles which play a mythomotoric role in the 
construction of national identity. In his view, triumph and trauma symbolize 
eternal anthropological categories of historical experience.10 Ernest Renan, one 
of the first theoreticians of nationhood, observes, moreover, that shared suffer-
ing is a stronger unifier than joy.11 Hence this article tries to reflect on how the 
NATO bombing has been commemorated in Serbia: as a negative traumatizing 
experience or as a heroic one?
I base my analysis on material in Serbian newspapers and internet portals, 
using them as my sources of information. Through their use of the very effective 
strategy of sourcing, news stories are predisposed to present a specific version 
of reality: A particular voice is chosen to be the source, so that the reports go 
unquestioned and are accepted as fact. In this way, the news stories position the 
reporter and the readers with regard to the content of the report. If the sourc-
ing is not used for reporting opposite views on an event, it is used as a tool for 
achieving hegemony and authority.12 Van Dijk reminds us that access to news 
media is largely available to ‘members of more powerful social groups and 
institutions, and especially their leaders (the elites) have more or less exclusive 
access’.13 As, in this article, I analyse official commemorative practices that are 
extensively covered by the state media, the use of such media as source mate-
rial does not seem too problematic. For alternative voices, I have relied on the 
oppositional, critically oriented media.
The sources used are thus the most circulated Serbian newspapers Politika, 
Večernje novosti, Blic, and Danas, as well as the online portals of B92 and Radio 
  8  Cf. Krisztina Rácz, Trauma or Entertainment? Collective Memories of the NATO Bombing 
in Serbia in this issue.
  9  Kendall Johnson, After the Storm. Healing After Trauma, Tragedy and Terror, Alameda/
CA 2006, 48.
10  Bernhard Giesen, Triumph and Trauma, London 2004; cf. Assmann, Der lange Schatten, 
14. 
11  Ernest Renan, Lecture at Sorbonne, 11 March 1882, in: Geoff Eley / Ronald G. Suny, eds, 
Becoming National. A Reader, New York, Oxford 1996, 41-55.
12  Cf. Romylyn A. Metila, A Discourse Analysis of News Headlines. Diverse Framings for 
a Hostage-Taking Event, Asian Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities 2, no. 2 (2013), 71-78, 72; 
Talaat Pasha, Islamists in the Headlines. Critical Discourse Analysis of the Representation of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian Newspapers, Doctoral thesis, University of Utah 2011.
13  Teun van Dijk, News Analysis. Case Studies of International and National News in the 
Press. Hillsdale/NJ 1988, 5; Allan Bell, The Language of News Media, Oxford 1991.
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Televizija Serbije (Radio Television of Serbia—RTS). In the media sphere, Poli-
tika and Večernje novosti support the views of the ruling establishment. Blic has 
changed over the course of time from an anti-Milošević newspaper to a tabloid, 
with this transformation gradually occurring from 2000 onwards. Between 2000 
and 2013 Danas and B92 were left-wing oriented media with critical editorial 
policies, especially towards the former Milošević regime and its followers. 
The activities of the state president, prime minister, ministers, politicians, 
army commanders, church leaders, and public figures were reported on, and 
mostly covered in some depth. Besides this, alternative and marginalized voices 
were also reported on in Danas, Blic and B92, and this allows me to sketch 
a fuller picture of the most important commemorative practices. However, 
these media are all centred on Belgrade, meaning that the picture they convey 
is almost entirely related to the capital, so that evidence about other cities and 
places in Serbia and their local commemorative practices remains somewhat 
scarce.
In the first section of this article, I show how commemorative discourse 
emerged, developed, and changed between 2000 and 2013. The second sec-
tion presents a case study of the fifteenth anniversary commemorations of the 
NATO bombings. I argue that although a stable commemorative pattern has 
been established, its semantics are ambivalent. This ambivalence can be found 
in the absence of a central ceremony, in the marginalized positions of monu-
ments dedicated to the victims, and in the more or less marginal coverage of 
the anniversaries themselves. The other key point that I make concerns those 
alternative voices who oppose the official policy. These come from victims’ 
families, who hold the Serbian state responsible, and also from right-wing 
movements, which take a polarized view, casting NATO as the aggressor and 
Serbia as an innocent, heroic victim.
Official Commemoration of the NATO  
Bombings from 2000 to 2013
The section that follows reviews the recurrent commemorative practices car-
ried out from the first anniversary of the NATO bombings up to the fourteenth 
anniversary in 2013. These include anniversary events, the commemorative 
policy of the leading Serbian politicians, and also alternative voices.
Official Commemoration 2000-2013: Continuity
Throughout the period, recurrent commemorative practices were carried out 
by the Serbian Orthodox Church, by the Yugoslav (later Serbian) Army and by 
groups of citizens. These will be considered in turn.
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Following the first anniversary, on 24 March 2000, memorial services dedi-
cated to all victims of the NATO bombings were conducted at noon in all Serbian 
Orthodox churches both in Serbia and outside its borders. Between 2000 and 
2012, the central memorial service was held in St. Mark’s Church in Belgrade. 
Exceptionally in 2013, it took place in the St. Sava Temple in Belgrade. Vojislav 
Koštunica, the last president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (2001-2003) 
and the then prime minister of Serbia (2005-2008), placed a special political 
significance on these church commemorations. During this period, the central 
church memorial service was a political event par excellence, attended by 
Koštunica, ministers of the Republic, politicians, Belgrade city representatives, 
members of the Serbian royal family, a range of citizens, and families of the 
victims. After Koštunica fell from power in 2008, the central church memorial 
service lost its political significance, and, following that, it was mainly attended 
simply by families of the victims and by citizens. The sermons delivered by the 
patriarch or bishop at the end of the services between 2000 and 2013 regularly 
employed a rhetoric of victimization: the whole Serbian nation was seen as 
a victim, while NATO was depicted as an unjust aggressor whose aim was to 
occupy Serbia’s historical territory in order to establish its military base there.14 
On 24 March each year, the Serbian Army and the Police also commonly 
commemorated the bombings, doing so in their institutions, units, and bar-
racks all over Serbia by laying wreaths and giving speeches at the monuments 
or memorials dedicated to fallen soldiers, and sometimes civilians as well. 
A memorial dedicated to pilots and other members of the Air Forces who had 
been killed was built at the Army Command Centre in Zemun in 2003.15 High 
ranking politicians chose this place to pay tribute to the victims; they included 
the Republic’s minister of defence, Dragan Šutanovac (in 2008 and 2009), and 
the first deputy prime minister Aleksandar Vučić (in 2013). Another important 
memory site that was established was Straževica Hill, situated in the Rakovica 
municipality of Belgrade. Since the underground command centre of the Yu-
goslav Army had been at Straževica, that area had regularly suffered heavy 
bombing, receiving some of the largest ammunition (up to three tons), whose 
explosions could be felt throughout Belgrade. In 2004, on the fifth anniversary 
of the bombing, a monument called the Messenger from Straževica (Glasnik sa 
Straževice) was constructed, dedicated to the soldiers who fell while engaged 
in maintaining communication lines.16 Representatives of the Socialist Party of 
Serbia (Socijalistička partija Srbije) placed special political significance on this 
place in their particular commemorative activities. 
14  Cf. Politika, Večernje novosti, 24-25 March 2000-2013.
15  Da ne snađe više nikoga, Blic, 25 March 2003, 3.
16  V. Veličković, Počast poginulim zastavnicima, Politika, 25 March 2004, 9.
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The commemorative practices of the Belgrade city authorities also fell into 
a stable pattern. On the first anniversary, in 2000, their representatives chose 
three ‘memory sites’. From then on, regardless of which party was in power, 
the city’s representatives attended the ceremonies. The sites chosen were: 
1. The Why? (Zašto?) monument in Belgrade’s Tašmajdan Park dedicated to 
those RTS employees, members of its technical staff, who were killed in a NATO 
airstrike while at work.17
2. The grave of a three year-old girl, Milica Rakić, who was killed in her bath-
room in Belgrade’s Batajnica neighbourhood on the afternoon of 17 April 1999, 
when shrapnel from a cluster bomb hit her in the head. Milica became a symbol 
for all the innocent civilian victims of the NATO bombing.
3. From 2003, the Dr. Dragiša Mišović Clinical Hospital Centre in Belgrade’s 
Dedinje neighbourhood, where seven Guards Brigade members and three pa-
tients were killed by a bomb on 20 May 1999. 
To summarize, the commemorative policy of the city authorities, led between 
2001 and 2014 by the Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka), encompassed 
both military and civilian victims, but put special emphasis on civilians and 
particularly those whose families accused the former Milošević regime of hav-
ing deliberately brought about their sacrifice.
Mainly as a result of local initiatives, monuments or memorial sites were 
gradually built throughout Serbia during these years. These were either monu-
ments in city centres dedicated to fallen soldiers, policemen and civilians alike, 
or plaques in local army barracks dedicated to soldiers especially. Tributes were 
regularly paid by local city representatives, army officials, citizens and families 
of the victims. As already mentioned, the newspapers I have been able to consult 
tend to be Belgrade-centric, so that information on other Serbian cities is rather 
scarce; hence those local commemorative practices reported through the local 
media warrant special research.
Anniversaries in 2000 and 2009
The first and the tenth anniversaries held special positions in the commemora-
tive policy. The first anniversary took place when Milošević was still in power, 
and it was widely observed. The first classes in every Serbian primary and 
secondary school were given over to reflection on the bombing. A text read to 
all pupils stated: 
17  More can be read about this in the following sections: ‘RTS Employees and Victims of 
the Wars 1990-1999’, and ‘Commemorating RTS Employees in 2014’.
466  Marija Mandić
‘NATO attacked our country because we were determined to defend our freedom 
and the right to independently determine our internal affairs. The main aim of the 
aggressor was to destroy our country and enslave our people.’18 
A special book named ‘Heroes of the Fatherland’ (Heroji otadžbine) was issued by 
the federal government. The book contained the names of 1,002 fallen soldiers 
and policemen and offered short biographies. Slobodan Milošević, federal presi-
dent at the time, wrote the preface. From 23 March to 11 June, the daily Politika 
devoted its covers to documentation of the NATO aggression. The daily Večernje 
novosti had the Unforgettable monument (Nezaboravnik) built in Tašmajdan Park, 
dedicated to the children who had been killed during the bombing. Organized 
by their trade unions, several thousand citizens gathered in Belgrade’s Nikola 
Pašić Square to commemorate the start of the bombing, while another group of 
citizens gathered in Republic Square under the slogan ‘The song kept us alive’, 
and they marked the anniversary with a musical programme led by popular 
pop and folk singers. On this first anniversary, almost all the bombed sites were 
visited by the ruling politicians: they went, for instance, to the Ušće Business 
Centre, to Straževica Hill, to the Chinese Embassy, and to Branko’s Bridge. 
On the tenth anniversary, all the schools in Serbia observed a minute’s silence 
at the beginning of the first class; later, sirens sounded at noon in all Serbian 
cities and people observed a minute’s silence on the streets; before commencing 
their regular meeting, the Serbian government did likewise. The government 
decided on this tenth anniversary to commission the construction of the Memo-
rial Centre in Belgrade. In the same city, a Race for Peace memorial footrace 
took place, with 250 participants. A right-wing memorial gathering entitled 
‘Serbia, remember!’ was held at the Sava Convention Centre and, besides Vo-
jislav Koštunica, those who attended included Serbian politicians, members of 
the Serbian Orthodox clergy, Russian politicians, and other public figures. Ivica 
Dačić, deputy prime minister and minister of internal affairs, opened a memo-
rial site in his own ministry building in memory of members of the police force 
who had been killed during the bombing.
Leading Serbian Politicians 
On 24 March 2000, Slobodan Milošević, president of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, laid a wreath in commemoration of the bombing at the Monument 
to the Unknown Hero (Spomenik neznanom junaku). This is on Avala, the moun-
tain at Belgrade’s south-eastern periphery. Milošević wrote in the memorial 
book: ‘Let those who fell defending the freedom and dignity of the people and 
18  Venci i sveće za sve nastradale, Blic, 25 March 2000, 8. All translations from Serbian 
newspapers are made by the author.
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the state against a new fascism be honoured.’19 After the democratic changes in 
Serbia in October 2000, Ivica Dačić, one of Milošević’s most loyal acolytes and 
a subsequent successor to the leadership of the Socialist Party of Serbia, led an 
oppositional commemorative gathering at Republic Square on 24 March 2001, 
the second anniversary of the bombing. At this gathering, accusations of national 
betrayal were made against the newly elected democrats. Dačić legitimized the 
policy of the previous regime by constructing an opposition between a general-
ized ethnic group (Serbs) and a homogenized, criminalized group of ‘others’: 
‘They have tried to put all of the blame on the Serbs for the past ten years. Serbs are 
not war criminals, instead the criminals are the Ustasha, Islamic fundamentalists, 
Albanian terrorists, NATO officials.’20 
As previously noted, Ivica Dačić and his colleagues from the Socialist Party 
of Serbia placed special political significance on the military memorial on 
Straževica Hill. From 2007 it became the place where Dačić and his party col-
leagues regularly paid tribute to the victims of the bombings and delivered 
political statements.21 In his statements made at the commemorations, Dačić 
exhorted citizens not to forget the soldiers who had sacrificed their lives whilst 
defending their country; he claimed that NATO had only attacked Serbia in order 
to capture Kosovo and Metohija.22 Dačić’s policy was thus oriented towards 
the commemoration of the soldiers and policemen who were killed. This also 
holds true for Aleksandar Vučić, who was a member of the ruling regime under 
Milošević too. In 2013, as the first deputy prime minister, Vučić paid tribute to 
the victims at the monument dedicated to the members of the Air Force and 
Air Defence in Zemun. In his speech, he adopted a strategy of claiming heroic 
victimization, and stated that Serbs ought to remember those who were ‘the brav-
est’ because they defended their country against a much stronger aggressor.23
Zoran Đinđić, prime minister of Serbia from 2001 until his assassination in 
2003,24 took a different approach to commemorating the bombings from that of 
19  Herojska odbrana otadžbine, Večernje novosti, 24 March 2000, cover page.
20  Ne zaboravite bombardovanje, Blic, 25 March 2001, 3. The Ustasha (Ustaša) were a fascist 
and ultranationalist Croatian organization, most active between 1929 and 1945. Fronting the 
Nazi-backed Independent State of Croatia during World War Two, the movement engaged in 
the mass murder of hundreds of thousands of Serbs, Jews, Roma and antifascist Croats within 
the territory under their control. When used in Serbian nationalist discourse, the term refers to 
Croats in general, thus grouping them all under the banner of this fascist movement. The term 
‘Albanian terrorists’ refers to Kosovo Albanians who were fighting for Kosovar independence.
21  Cf. Politika, Večernje novosti, 24-25 March 2000-2013.
22  Cf. Politika, Večernje novosti, 24-25 March 2000-2013.
23  Obeležavanje NATO agresije: Srbija bila iznad svega, Večernje novosti, 24 March 2013, 
http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/drustvo/aktuelno.290.html:425849-Obelezavanje-
NATO-agresije-Srbija-bila-iznad-svega. All internet sources were accessed on 10 October 2016.
24  Đinđić was one of the founders of the modern Democratic Party, becoming its president 
in 1994. He was at the forefront of opposition to Slobodan Milošević and his regime. He 
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most other Serbian politicians. During the bombings, he had fled to Montenegro, 
allegedly on account of his being next on the assassination list of the Milošević-
controlled state security service. This move put his political career in serious 
jeopardy, and he was denounced as a ‘traitor’ and a ‘NATO mercenary’.25 In 2000, 
alongside other oppositional political leaders, he accused the Milošević regime 
of bringing about the bombings and entreated people not to mark this ‘tragic day 
and defeat’.26 During his time as prime minister, official commemoration of the 
bombings was completely marginalized: it was relegated to president Vojislav 
Koštunica and the Church, and was almost invisible in the media. Đinđić never 
gave any official statements at the 24 March ceremonies.27
In 2000, along with other democratic oppositional politicians, Vojislav 
Koštunica condemned the policies of the Milošević governments and the So-
cialist Party of Serbia, holding them responsible for the NATO bombings, and 
he called on citizens not to commemorate them.28 However, during his time as 
president of the country (2001-2004) and then prime minister (2005-2008), he did 
give political statements on the bombings—though only in St. Mark’s Church. 
In 2002, Koštunica accused the former Milošević regime of bringing about the 
NATO attacks, and said that they could have been avoided. He also stated that 
Serbia needed to cooperate with the NATO countries.29 In 2003, however, the 
targets of his criticism began to change, and he started criticizing the policies 
of NATO and the West. He pointed out that the authoritarian regime against 
which the intervention was allegedly directed lasted for more than a year after 
the bombing and it was only defeated by voting, not by bombs. Contrary to 
his previous statements, Koštunica said that he hoped Serbia would not join 
the NATO alliance.30 In 2008, his statement was even more critical of NATO: 
‘This was the brutal demolition of our country, aimed at making Kosovo and Me-
tohija into the first NATO state in the world […]. Serbia is a free country and the 
policy of the power which is enacted over Serbia is blind and short-term, like that 
of every other power which used to come to the Balkans.’31 
advocated reforms and Serbia’s integration into the European Union, and it was during his 
mandate that Milošević was handed over to the Hague Tribunal. It is speculated that this was 
one of the main reasons for his assassination. His murderers were imprisoned and sentenced, 
but the political background to the assassination remains unsolved to this day, cf. Miloš Vasić, 
Atentat na Zorana Đinđića, Beograd 2005.
25  Cf. Tim Judah, Zoran Djindjic: Pragmatist or Opportunist?, BBC News, 6 March 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1086035.stm. 
26  Rat se mogao izbeći, Blic, 24 March 2000, 2.
27  Cf. Večernje novosti, 24 March 2001-2002.
28  Rat se mogao izbeći, Blic, 24 March 2000, 2.
29  M. Radetić, Zločin i tuga večni, Večernje novosti, 25 March 2002, 7.
30  M. Radetić, U slavu branilaca i žrtava, Večernje novosti, 25 March 2003, 20-21.
31  Vojislav Koštunica, Cilj bombardovanja pravljenje NATO države, Danas, 24 March 2008, 3.
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In 2009, as president of the Democratic Party of Serbia (Demokratska stranka 
Srbije), Koštunica stated that 
‘the real aim of those who attacked Serbia was to geostrategically anchor Kosovo and 
Metohija and move further into the East. Serbia should never give up its strongest 
weapon—justice and truth.’32
Boris Tadić, during his presidency, chose the Unforgettable monument in 
Tašmajdan Park as the place where he would pay tribute to those who had died 
in the bombings: it was dedicated to child victims. Here he delivered political 
statements in 2005, 2006, and 2008. On 24 March 2009, he was participating at the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, but released a statement: 
‘Today we need to remember all victims but also to learn something and make 
foundations for a new peaceful policy, so that Serbian policy-makers never draw 
the country and its citizens into such danger. We need to make policy which takes 
care of the lives of ordinary people.’33 
All of his statements between 2005 and 2009 can be summarized as follows: the 
bombing was the result of wrong policy taken by Serbia; it resulted in many 
innocent victims, and it should never happen again. This attitude was (and is) 
common among other prominent politicians within the Democratic Party, such 
as Dragan Šutanovac and Dragan Đilas. According to them, Milošević’s policy 
was hazardous and damaging; the NATO bombing claimed many innocent vic-
tims, and Serbia should in future cooperate with NATO and the NATO countries.
The commemorative records of the leading Serbian politicians in the 2000-
2013 period show that all the politicians who were in power during the 1999 
bombings, such as Milošević, Dačić, and Vučić, chose military sites for com-
memoration. In discourse, Milošević used the strategy of victimization and built 
his rhetoric on the opposition of Serbs as new ‘Jews’ (victims) and NATO forces 
as new ‘fascists’. Dačić also constructed an opposition between Serbs, whom he 
saw as victims, and a unified, criminalized group of wartime enemies. In con-
trast, Zoran Đinđić maintained that the Milošević regime was largely to blame 
for the bombing, and insisted that it should not be commemorated. Koštunica 
changed his stance over the course of time from one that was anti-Milošević 
and moderately pro-Western to one of a nationalist and extreme anti-NATO 
orientation. Boris Tadić and his party colleagues chose monuments dedicated 
to civilian casualties to pay tribute to the victims of the bombings. In their 
statements, however, they kept up a moderate criticism of the former regime 
and its policies, maintaining that these had drawn the country into a disastrous 
32  Vojislav Koštunica, Srbija ne sme da odustane od istine i prava, Danas, 25 March 2009, 3.
33  Srbija utihla uz zvuk sirena, Blic, 25 March 2009, http://www.blic.rs/vesti/reportaza/
srbija-utihla-uz-zvuk-sirena/l21c7js.
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conflict. They called for peaceful politics in the future, and made a plea for 
cooperation with NATO.
Alternative Voices
An examination of the media reveals overwhelmingly one-sided national 
coverage, the Serbian media reporting almost exclusively on Serbian commemo-
rations and rarely mentioning how the Kosovo Albanians might commemorate 
the same events. The exceptions are Danas and B92, which did produce some 
reports on Albanian commemorative practices. Commemorative practices op-
posing official policy were occasionally reported too in oppositional newspapers 
and portals like Blic, Danas and B92. I can discern three main alternative voices 
during the 2000-2013 period. The first came from the anti-Milošević activists, 
who protested in 2000 during the bombing commemoration; the second came 
from pro-Milošević forces (both moderate and extreme right-wing political 
activists), who protested in 2001 and 2002, after the fall of Milošević, and then 
again between 2007 and 2009; the third and most persistent voice opposing the 
official commemorations came from the families of the RTS employees who 
were killed in the bombings.
Anti-Milošević vs. Pro-Milošević Activists
In 2000, the leaders of all democratic opposition parties, namely Zoran Đinđić, 
Vuk Drašković, and Vojislav Koštunica, blamed the policies of the Milošević re-
gime for the NATO bombings; and they appealed to citizens not to commemorate 
what they saw as a tragic defeat.34 The student-led movement against Milošević, 
Resistance! (Otpor!), marked 24 April of that year by organizing protests all over 
Serbia under the slogan ‘Resistance to aggression’. The protests and gatherings 
had two simultaneous aims: to condemn the NATO aggression and to resist the 
aggression of Milošević and his ruling party.35
Interestingly enough, following the overthrow of the Milošević regime, op-
positional commemorative gatherings came to be organized by Milošević’s own 
followers. Thus, on 24 March in both 2001 and 2002, the ex-regime parties, along 
with 10,000 supporters, held mass protests in Republic Square. The protests were 
manifold: to commemorate the bombings; to protest against cooperation with 
the Hague Tribunal and the extradition of those accused of war crimes; and 
to call for extraordinary elections. These protests were held under the slogan 
‘Never forget, never repeat’, with protesters carrying placards bearing slogans 
such as ‘Betrayal’, ‘Slobo, Slobo’, and ‘We will not give you to them’ (‘them’ 
34  Rat se mogao izbeći, Blic, 24 March 2000, 2.
35  Otpor agresiji, Blic, 25 March 2000, 8.
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being the Hague Tribunal). The 2001 gathering was addressed by Ivica Dačić, 
then in his role as vice-president of the Socialist Party of Serbia.36
In the period 2007-2009, protests were held by extreme right-wing groups and 
their followers. The neo-Nazi group National Formation (Nacionalni stroj) staged 
a rally in the centre of Belgrade on 24 March 2007, protesting against the pro-
Western policies of the Serbian government. Leaflets disseminated among people 
at this protest proclaimed: ‘Let us show how loyal we are to Mother Serbia. Let 
us show that we do not forget our innocent victims.’ Strongly condemning this 
gathering, Serbian nongovernmental organizations committed to promoting hu-
man rights demanded that it be banned.37 In 2008, the police banned a meeting 
National Formation had planned in central Belgrade. The police also forbade 
a protest by the anti-Hague group Association Freedom (Udruženje sloboda) 
which was to take place in front of the US Embassy.38 A rally was nevertheless 
held in Republic Square by extreme right-wing groups including Ours (Naši), 
1389, Honor (Obraz), The Doors (Dveri), Freedom (Sloboda), the Ravna Gora 
Movement (Ravnogorski pokret), and the Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna 
stranka). Their slogans were: ‘We want weapons’, ‘Kill, slaughter Shiptars until 
there are no Shiptars left’, ‘Kill, kill the Shiptars’, ‘Tadić, Ustasha’ and ‘We will 
not hand over Mladić, but Tadić instead.’39 Some of them also gave Nazi salutes 
and burned the flag of the European Union. The event was attended by the 
Metropolitan bishop Amfilohije Radović, some Serbian academics and Russian 
politicians. The protesters clashed with members of the police force and also 
attacked journalists; many were injured and significant material damage was 
inflicted on property.40 
It is noteworthy that the escalation of pro-Milošević rallies took place when 
the pro-Western Democratic Party, which advocated cooperation with the Hague 
Tribunal, was in power. This was from 2001 to 2002, under Zoran Đinđić’s ten-
ure as Serbian prime minister, and from 2007 to 2009, during the presidency 
of Boris Tadić. During these periods, attempts were made by Democratic Party 
officials to establish an alternative narrative about the bombings, in which the 
main responsible agents were Milošević and his regime.
36  Ne zaboravite bombardovanje, Blic, 25 March 2001, 3.
37  Parastos, cveće i skup lidera nacionalnog stroja, Danas, 24-25 March 2007, 4.
38  Nacionalni stroj najavljuje dolazak, Danas, 24 March 2008, 3.
39  Shqip(ë)tar is an ethnonym (endonym) used by Albanians to refer to themselves. The 
standard term for Albanians in South Slavic languages is Albanci, cf. Franke Wilmer, The Social 
Construction of Man, the State and War. Identity, Conflict, and Violence in Former Yugoslavia, 
Routledge 2004, 100. When Shiptar (Šiptar) is used instead in South Slavic languages, it carries 
derogatory and politically incorrect connotations. Its use in Serbian nationalist discourse is 
extremely derogatory.
40  U sukobima posle protesta petoro povređenih, Danas, 25 March 2009, 3.
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In contrast to this, the narrative perpetuated by pro-Milošević factions and 
ultra-nationalists was built around the supposed opposition between ‘Serbs’ as 
victims and generalized Serbian wartime enemies, embodied in the (derogatory) 
ethnic labels ‘Shiptar’ and ‘Ustasha’, NATO, the Hague Tribunal, and ‘national 
traitors’. The enemies in this narrative belonged to a single group lumped to-
gether, in which any one could be equated with any other.
RTS Employees and Victims of the Wars 1990-99
The commemoration of the RTS employees that was organized by their fami-
lies on 24 March at the Why? monument in Tašmajdan Park contrasts dramati-
cally with both the extreme right-wing demonstrations and the state policy. 
NATO’s bombing of the central building of RTS occurred on 23 April 1999 and 
was one of the most controversial strikes made during the Alliance’s campaign. 
When a single NATO missile hit the building, sixteen employees, all technical 
staff, were killed, and the facility was severely damaged. NATO Headquarters 
justified this attack on the grounds that media is a weapon during wars and that 
RTS had an important role in the Serbian war and nationalist propaganda. The 
station, however, resumed its broadcasts twenty-four hours later from a secret 
location. The French government had opposed attacking the RTS building as an 
illegitimate war target. The raid was also criticized by Amnesty International 
as a war crime. According to a 2009 Amnesty International article, nobody has 
been held responsible for it and the victims have not been given justice.41
In Serbia, opinion has been divided. On one side, the state’s commemora-
tive policy tended towards condemnation of NATO for choosing a media and 
broadcasting building as a legitimate war target. On the other side, the families 
of the RTS victims held the Milošević regime responsible for the deaths. Since 
all journalists and editors had been evacuated in advance, the families accused 
the Serbian authorities of deliberately sacrificing the technical staff so as to 
provoke anti-NATO sentiment around the world. The families of the victims 
built the Why? monument which is engraved with all the victims’ names. They 
sued the general manager of RTS, Dragoljub Milanović, in the Serbian District 
Court. In 2002, Milanović was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for having 
failed to evacuate the building. Initially he was allowed to go home for week-
ends and holidays but his conditions were made stricter after strong reactions 
from the victims’ families.42 The families were likewise dissatisfied with the 
41  Amnesty International, No Justice for the Victims of NATO Bombings, 23 April 2009, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2009/04/no-justicia-victimas-bombardeos-otan- 
20090423.
42  Biljana Vasić, Sto godina samoće, Vreme, 6 September 2012, http://www.vreme.co.rs/
cms/view.php?id=1070972.
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whole judicial process since they wanted to see other Serbian officials held 
accountable.43
On each 24 March, the families and friends of the victims gathered at the 
Why? monument, and one or two family members gave official statements to 
the media in the name of all the families. In 2003, Žanka Stojanović, a mother of 
one of the RTS victims, stated: ‘It is shame that four years after the bombing we 
do not know the exact number killed in the NATO aggression.’44 In 2004, Kuz-
man Stoimenovski, a father of one of the victims, spoke on behalf of the families: 
‘It hurts us most when we see that our state does not even try to give us satisfaction 
before the law and adequately punish those who were obliged to protect employees 
of the RTS.’45 
In 2007, Stojanović said: ‘The murderers of our children are walking freely 
among us. I thus ask all of those who are responsible why is that so?’46 In 2010, 
Stojanović went further: 
‘Today we mark eleven years of our pain, and fight for the moment when the state 
admits the truth, that it killed sixteen people. Now, the right people to address 
are the president of Serbia Boris Tadić, the minister of defence Dragan Šutanovac, 
and the special prosecutor Miljko Radisavljević. In front of them lay more than 
a hundred pieces of evidence, and if they don’t want to return to court then they 
need to explain it.’47 
In 2012, Dragan Đilas, the mayor of Belgrade and a high-ranking official within 
the Democratic Party, supported the families and complained that to that day 
they did not know who was responsible for the deaths of the RTS employees. 
Žanka Stojanović also claimed that the Supreme Defence Council knew that 
the building was to be bombed and that the Ministry of Defence was mainly 
to blame for the tragedy—but that the minister of defence was concealing it.48
In 2012, a monument dedicated to the victims of the wars and the soldiers who 
fell between 1990 and 1999 was erected in Belgrade’s Sava Square. The monu-
ment’s appearance is not particularly striking and its opening was marginalized 
by the media. Some of the victims’ families were disappointed by the monu-
43  Marija Ristić, Žrtve bombardovanja RTS-a nezadovoljne puštanjem Milanovića, Balkan 
Insight, 5 September 2012, http://www.balkaninsight.com/rs/article/zrtve-bombardovanja-rts-
a-nezadovoljne-pustanjem-milanovica.
44  I danas i uvek – zašto, Večernje novosti, 25 March 2003, 20.
45  P. Ilić, Da se nikad ne zaboravi, Politika, 25 March 2004, 9.
46  Obeležena godišnjica bombardovanja NATO, Politika, 25 March 2007,
http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/23782/Obelezena-godisnjica-bombardovanja-NATO.
47  Jedanaest godina od početka NATO bombardovanja, Blic, 25 March 2010, http://www.
blic.rs/vesti/hronika/jedanaest-godina-od-pocetka-nato-bombardovanja/mt82jyc.
48  Tadić: NATO bombardovanje bio zločin protiv našeg naroda i države, Blic, 25 March 2012, 
http://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/tadic-nato-bombardovanje-bio-zlocin-protiv-naseg-naroda-
i-drzave/m1ct984.
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ment and, for this reason, did not allow Dragan Đilas, the mayor of Belgrade, 
or representatives of the Army and Police to pay tribute to the victims there on 
24 March. They said that, having waited twelve years for this monument, they 
thought it looked ‘humiliating’ and ‘shameful’.49
The Fifteenth Anniversary of the NATO  
Bombing in Serbia
In the second section of this article, I present the acts and statements of 
leading Serbian politicians and public figures as they marked the fifteenth 
anniversary of the bombings. As each anniversary has reignited controversial 
issues, I also discuss the polemics of the fifteenth commemoration. One of the 
controversies is, most certainly, related to the RTS workers. As shown above, 
the case of the RTS employees brings to the fore a division and latent conflict 
between official commemorative policy and the views of the victims’ families. 
Another controversial issue is that the anniversary was not officially observed 
in Serbian schools, as it had been on the first and the tenth anniversaries, and 
this led some pupils to organize spontaneous commemorations. This resulted 
in many conflicts and accusations between those who wanted to commemorate 
the bombings and those who did not. A more detailed overview of the 2014 
commemorations is presented in the Appendix.
Official Commemorations in 2014
Not only was the fifteenth anniversary of the NATO bombings not marked 
in the schools, there was no central state ceremony either. Instead, a series of 
commemorative events took place across the country, with only moderate me-
dia coverage. Serbia’s leading politicians thus visited different memorial sites 
to mark the fifteen years since NATO launched its bombing campaign. For the 
present analysis, I will focus on five commemorative acts which were performed 
by Serbia’s most prominent politicians and public figures, and which, therefore, 
convey the strongest symbolic meanings.
Serbia’s president, Tomislav Nikolić, paid tribute to the civilians killed dur-
ing the bombing of Varvarin, a small town in central Serbia. On a fine sunny 
afternoon, 30 May 1999, which was also a Church holiday, NATO forces had 
bombed the bridge crossing the Velika Morava river in Varvarin. Ten civilians 
49  Đilas sprečen da položi venac na spomenik žrtvama ratova od 1990. do 1999. godine, 
Blic, 25 March 2012, http://www.blic.rs/vesti/beograd/djilas-sprecen-da-polozi-venac-na-
spomenik-zrtvama-ratova-od-1990-do-1999-godine/lhj3pp1.
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were killed and thirty were injured, sixteen severely.50 The Serbian president 
laid a wreath in front of a monument dedicated to the civilian victims and gave 
the following statement:
‘Do not expect me to forget what happened during the aggression on Serbia, over 
seventy-eight days and nights from 24 March to 9 June. Also, I cannot forget that, 
on a Sunday, on 30 May 1999, during the Orthodox holiday of the Holy Trinity, 
at around one o’clock, NATO forces used four missiles to bomb the bridge over 
the Velika Morava […]. All of these years we have been counting the victims of 
the pursuit of political goals by those who are more powerful. If, along with the 
thousands of names of innocent victims who all of us mention and mourn—not 
just their families—we had also learnt the name of at least one executioner or of 
someone who gave the command and they had been punished, then it would be 
easier for us. Most of us neither forgive nor forget. We Serbs are a strange people, 
we may even forgive most of them […]. Someone would probably forgive if we 
heard a sincere apology for the unprincipled bombing of a bridge when people 
happened to be celebrating a regular Christian holiday […]. We are seeking truth 
at any price, for the sake of the peace of mind that is possible and for the sake of 
the reconciliation which we also need.’51
On the same day, the outgoing Serbian prime minister, Ivica Dačić, laid a wreath 
at a memorial site dedicated to the victims of the NATO bombings on Straževica 
Hill, just as he had done in previous years. Wreaths were also laid at this monu-
ment by the outgoing parliamentary speaker, Nebojša Stefanović, and family 
members of fallen soldiers from the 210th Signals Battalion of the Yugoslav 
Army. The ceremony was also attended by several ministers. After the playing 
of the national anthem and a minute’s silence, a priest, Nenad Đuršević, held 
a memorial service for the military and civilian victims of NATO’s bombing. 
On this occasion, Ivica Dačić stated:
‘A nation which forgets its victims and its history is doomed to relive [that his-
tory]. We need to keep the memory of all those who defended our country, all of 
whom were innocent victims […]. This year the international community has been 
increasingly talking about the legal framework for the bombing of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, but this did not exist […]. It is certain that the events that 
50  Since German military aircraft took part in this attack, the families of victims sued 
the German government. The initiative actually came from German pacifist activists who 
provided financial and legal support to the plaintiff. The families of victims also wanted to 
sue the governments of other countries that had taken part in the attack, but lacked financial 
resources for this. The accusations against the German government were rejected by Germany’s 
Constitutional Court. Cf. N. E. Stanisavljević, Nemci nas razumeju, Glas javnosti, 7 November 
2003, http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.rs/arhiva/2003/11/07/srpski/R03110601.shtml.
51  Petnaesta godišnjica NATO bombardovanja, Radio Television Serbia, 24 March 2014, http://
www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/125/Dru%C5%A1tvo/1555752/Petnaesta+godi%C5%A1njic
a+NATO+bombardovanja+.html.
476  Marija Mandić
followed NATO’s aggression were designed to break up the territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of Serbia.’52
He then reminded his hearers that ‘more than 2,000 people were killed and 
more than 10,000 were injured, with material damage of several tens of billions 
of dollars’. Dačić added: 
‘An integral part of the future is [remembrance] of our past and drawing lessons 
from it. The day today serves so that we do not forget […]. Commander of the 
210th Battalion, Major Željko Lukić, noted in his address that during the seventy-
eight-day campaign […] NATO dropped 21,000 tons of explosives and that 1,150 
aircraft fired 1,300 cruise missiles and about 2,900 bombs. Forty-one members of 
the Yugoslav Air Force and Air Defence died during the war.’
Belgrade’s acting mayor, Siniša Mali, laid a wreath at a memorial site dedicated 
to the soldiers of the Guards Brigade and patients of the Dr. Dragiša Mišović 
Clinical Hospital Centre. Members of the city government paid their respects 
and laid a wreath at the grave of three-year-old Milica Rakić and at the monu-
ment dedicated to the RTS employees in Tašmajdan Park.53 
At St. Mark’s Church in Belgrade, the Serbian Patriarch, Irinej, led a liturgy 
and memorial service (parastos) dedicated to all victims of the NATO bombings. 
Although no central ceremony was held, there was a definite overall strategy 
for the commemorations of the NATO bombings. They took place at a series of 
places that had witnessed suffering and at monuments to those who had fallen. 
A maximum number of sites was chosen, widely dispersed over the whole of 
Serbia. The ceremonies honoured both military and civilian victims. The presi-
dent paid tribute to the civilians; the prime minister commemorated those in 
the armed forces; the acting mayor of Belgrade commemorated all who had 
died at the city hospital; and the patriarch led a paying of respects to every life 
the NATO bombings had claimed. This strategy shows how the whole nation, 
embracing soldiers and civilians alike, was held up as both ‘victim’ and ‘hero’. 
The acts commemorating soldiers, however, were more numerous than those for 
civilians: many commemorative acts were carried out in army barracks, where 
professional soldiers paid tribute to their fellows (see Appendix).
Analysis of the speeches of the president and the prime minister, show a com-
mon strand: the imperative not to forget. 
‘Do not expect me to forget what happened […] Also, I cannot forget that, on 
a Sunday, on 30 May 1999, during the Orthodox holiday […] Most of us neither 
forgive nor forget.’ (T. Nikolić) 
52  ‘Nation that Forgets History Is Doomed to Repeat It’, B92, 24 March 2014, http://www.
b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2014&mm=03&dd=24&nav_id=89749.
53  Zaposleni na katedri za reziju prekinuli protest, B92, 24 March 2014, http://www.b92.
net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2014&mm=03&dd=24&nav_id=8276 58.
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‘A nation which forgets its victims and its history is doomed to relive [that history]. 
Today’s [ceremony] serves so that we do not forget this.’ (I. Dačić) 
The statement by the president expressed a wish to have light shed on the kill-
ing of innocent civilians, and NATO’s bombing was evaluated as an unjust act 
against humanity. Nikolić drew a distinction between forgetting and forgiving; 
he articulated the imperative not to forget but, at the same time, left open a pos-
sibility of forgiveness—under the condition that Serbia would receive a sincere 
apology from the NATO countries. This interplay between ‘forget’ and ‘forgive’ 
is indicative of the turn in policy of Nikolić and his acolytes from an anti-Western 
stance to a pro-Western one. Dačić judged the NATO bombing to be an illegal 
act aimed at destroying Serbia, and he presented a narrative that summarized 
the consequences of the NATO bombing in this light. It is precisely this narrative 
that came to be repeated by all of the main media outlets in Serbia.
Commemorating the RTS Employees in 2014 
Members of the Belgrade government paid respects at the Why? Monument, 
and laid a wreath there. Andrija Mladenović, the city’s representative, stated: 
‘Today we are here to commemorate the death of the RTS employees who were 
killed while doing their job. We should never forget what happened to us because 
it is a great warning for the whole world that you cannot in that way bomb a sov-
ereign state and destroy lives and destroy its economy.’
Wreaths were also laid on behalf of RTS by the organization’s acting director, 
General Nikola Mirkov, and editors of the RTS news teams. Mirkov stressed 
that the bombing of the RTS building had been a horrific crime, showing that 
NATO had decided to violate all international principles and attack a country 
without the consent of the UN Security Council, while also targeting civilians 
in its campaign.
Families, colleagues and friends also paid their respects. Žanka Stojanović 
told the media that nobody in Serbia had an answer to the question why these 
thousands of victims had been necessary, including those killed in the state 
broadcasting building. Probably, she said, the families would never get an an-
swer. She added that she was still hoping that all those who had been responsible 
would be put on trial—both those who had known the building was marked 
as a military target and those who had bombed it. The commemoration by the 
RTS victims’ families has thus persisted for fifteen years in raising an alternative 
voice to the official politics of memory. 
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The Case of the Ivan Sarić Secondary Technical School  
in Subotica in 2014
Since no instructions were given by the Ministry of Education of the Republic 
of Serbia, spontaneous commemorative acts were organized in some Serbian 
schools, but these resulted in controversies and unexpected incidents. At Ivan 
Sarić Secondary Technical School in Subotica, the student council asked to be 
allowed to mark the fifteenth anniversary of the bombings. The school’s officials 
and its headmistress, Eržebet Ivanović, said that such an activity had not been 
planned by the school’s authority. Shortly afterwards, an internet campaign was 
launched, particularly on Facebook, in which the headmistress was accused of 
forbidding her pupils from commemorating the anniversary. The campaign 
was led by Boris Malagurski, a Serbian-Canadian film director, producer, TV 
host, and highly influential social media activist, with right-wing sympathies, 
who claimed that some of the school’s pupils had written to him and sought 
his help. On 20 March, Malagurski put a post on his Facebook page claiming 
that the school’s headmistress had forbidden the pupils from marking the an-
niversary. He published Ivanović’s work telephone number and implored his 
followers to call her and put pressure on her. In his Facebook post, Malagurski 
wrote: ‘Eržebet Ivanović forbade children from being aware of their history.’ 
The post accumulated almost 3,000 ‘likes’ and was shared more than 500 times. 
Many people answered Malagurski’s call and contacted the headmistress; in 
comments responding to Malagurski’s post, they maintained that she had prom-
ised to allow her pupils to mark the anniversary. Some commentators tried to 
start a hate campaign against the headmistress, even calling on people to go 
to her office and spit in her face. Meanwhile, an online petition was organized, 
under the title ‘Down with Eržebet Ivanović’; it clamoured for her resignation 
and was signed by 140 people. On 21 March, Malagurski put out a new post 
on Facebook in which he proclaimed victory: 
‘Dear friends, we succeeded. After my call to all of you to react as a community 
and call her in her office and protest because of her decision, the headmistress who 
forbade pupils from marking the fifteenth anniversary of the NATO bombings has 
given in and allowed the pupils to commemorate the victims of the NATO aggres-
sion and have a presentation about [the historical events].’ 
This post accrued more than 3,500 ‘likes’ and was shared 162 times. Many 
people subsequently criticized Malagurski on the grounds of harassment and 
the promotion of intolerance towards the headmistress.54 Ivan Sarić Secondary 
Technical School issued an official statement in which it was affirmed that the 
54  Zlostavljanje u tri slike, Peščanik, 24 March 2014, http://pescanik.net/zlostavljanje-u-tri-
slike.
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commemoration of the anniversary of the NATO bombings was not planned 
within the school programme.55 
Conclusion
In this article,56 I have shown how the commemorative discourse on NATO’s 
bombing of Serbia emerged, developed and changed over the years following the 
attacks. I have described the recurring commemorative practices of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church and the Yugoslav (later Serbian) Army, as well as the com-
memorations of civilian victims, such as child victims (the Unforgettable monu-
ment and the grave of Milica Rakić), and those honouring the RTS employees. 
The commemorations of the RTS employees, however, included many voices 
opposed to the official discourse and have thus been highly controversial. The 
first and tenth anniversaries held a special place in the commemorative policy, 
these being the only times when the commemoration were included within the 
school curriculum.
NATO’s bombing of Serbia has, of course, had ambivalent semantics in Serbian 
commemorative discourses. On the one hand, there have been the leading Ser-
bian politicians who were in power during the bombing, people like Milošević, 
Dačić, and Vučić. These have employed a strategy of victimization, oscillating 
between the semantics of innocent, passive victimhood (equating Serbs with 
the Jews during Second World War) and honouring the heroic fallen (Serbs as 
fighters defending their country). On the other hand, some have attempted to 
establish an alternative narrative. In this differing perspective, held especially 
by oppositional, anti-Milošević politicians and movements, the bombing has 
been evaluated as a defeat and a tragedy. The clearest examples of this alter-
native stance is represented by Zoran Đinđić, who tried to marginalize com-
memorations of the bombings during his time in power, and the families of the 
RTS victims, who have blamed the Serbian state and its officials for the civilian 
deaths just as much as they condemn NATO.
Although it is easier, and more common, to remember victories rather than 
defeats, a defeat, as Assmann reminds us, need not necessarily destroy the 
positive self-image a collective has about itself.57 However, I also detect some 
ambivalence in the marginalization of official commemorations and monuments 
dedicated to the victims. Although the highest ranking politicians have taken 
55  Škola nije zabranila pomen žrtvama NATOa, website of the City of Subotica, Grad Subo-
tica, 23 March 2014, http://www.gradsubotica.co.rs/skola-nije-zabranila-pomen-zrtvama-natoa.
56  The current article is a result of the project ‘Language, folklore, migrations in the Balkans’ 
(no. 178010) funded by the Ministry of Science of the Republic of Serbia and the kind support 
provided by a Humboldt Research Fellowship for postdoctoral researchers 2016-2018 at the 
Institute for Slavic Studies of the Humboldt University in Berlin.
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part in each commemoration, the ceremonies have never ranked as the main 
news stories of the day, even on the occasion of the tenth anniversary. The rea-
son for this ambivalence is to be found in Serbia’s attempts to make progress 
towards Euro-Atlantic integration. Interestingly enough, the commemorative 
discourses on the bombings have never made use of the popular discourse on 
the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, which is portrayed as a heroic defeat for the Serbian 
Kingdom at the hands of the Ottomans, and which has a crucial mythomotoric 
role in the construction of Serbian national identity. The official commemora-
tion has also been dissociated from the 1999 Serbian-Albanian conflict. Kosovo 
has only been mentioned in the official commemorative discourse in terms of 
NATO pretensions over the territory.
My case study of the fifteenth anniversary of the bombings showed that, just 
as in previous years, commemorations were held at a series of places of suffering 
and at monuments around Serbia. The main strategy employed by the politi-
cians was to project an image of heroic victimization. The anti-NATO sentiment, 
which had once been so extreme, had decreased in intensity, especially among 
the politicians who had been in power or close to the ruling regime during the 
bombings. Instead, their discourse revolved around a topos of ‘forgive but do not 
forget’. It is worth noting that the sixteenth anniversary (outside the parameters 
of this research) more or less repeated the commemorative acts and discourses 
from the previous year. This implies that a stable commemorative pattern has 
been established. The controversy which occurred on the fifteenth anniversary 
at the Ivan Sarić Secondary Technical School in Subotica, however, brings us 
to a dilemma: should the bombings be officially commemorated in Serbian 
schools or not? And, if yes, in what way? These are very important questions, 
in my opinion, because if a collective does not pay attention to its memories 
then there is a danger that, one day, they may reverberate uncontrollably or be 
used as sources for manipulation.
Appendix: Commemorative Acts for the Fifteenth Anniversary  
of the Bombings58
1) In Novi Sad, the mayor, Miloš Vučević, along with the dead soldiers’ fami-
lies and delegations from the Novi Sad garrison and the Federation of Associa-
tions of Second World War Soldiers (Savez udruženja boraca narodnooslobodilačkog 
rata), laid wreaths at a memorial site in the Jugovićevo army barracks. Vučević 
stated that the NATO bombings had been one of the most tragic events in the 
history of Serbia and of Novi Sad.
58  15 godina od NATO bombardovanja, Radio Television Serbia, 24 March 2014, http://www.
rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/125/drustvo/1555752/petnaesta-godisnjica-nato-bombardovanja-.
html; 15 godina od NATO bombardovanja, B92, 24 March 2014, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/
index.php?yyyy=2014&mm=03&dd=24&nav_id=827205.
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2) Representatives of Belgrade’s Obrenovac municipality laid wreaths at 
a memorial site dedicated to those killed during the bombings.
3) In Jagodina, the fifteenth anniversary was marked by the laying of wreaths 
at a memorial site in the police station dedicated to eight policemen who were 
killed and at a monument dedicated to Goran Ostojić, a lieutenant-colonel in 
the Yugoslav Army and a member of the 63rd Parachute Brigade.
4) In Smederevo, representatives of the local authorities, the Army, the Police, 
the victims’ families, soldiers’ associations, civil organizations and political 
parties laid wreaths at a monument dedicated to people from the city who had 
been killed during the bombing.
5) At Niš, the laying of wreaths at a memorial site in the University Square 
commemorated the fifty-six people who were killed and over 200 who were 
injured during the bombing of the city.
6) Wreaths were laid at a memorial site in the Rasina army barracks in 
Kruševac. This was done by local politicians, members of the army, and the 
families of dead soldiers. Soldiers from the Kruševac garrison symbolically 
planted fifteen Japanese cherry saplings at the Car Lazar army barracks in 
memory of casualties from the NATO action.
7) By the laying of a wreath at a memorial site in Vranje, tribute was paid to 
the soldiers, policemen and citizens of Vranje (and its environs) who were killed.
8) A remembrance day dedicated to those killed in the bombings was held at 
a memorial site known as The Heroes of the Thirty-Seventh Motorized Brigade 
(Herojima 37. motorizovane brigade) in Raška. The head of the main headquarters 
of the Serbian Army, General Ljubiša Diković, laid a wreath, stating that ‘the 
army fought bravely for its people’ and that ‘the people aligned with the army’.
9) Aleksandar Vulin, a minister without portfolio in charge of matters concern-
ing Kosovo and Metohija, requested that the United Nations publish a report 
on the consequences of the NATO bombing campaign. 
10) Representatives of the local authorities in Kosovska Mitrovica and Zvečan 
in northern Kosovo, along with representatives of the Serbian-Russian Society 
(Društvo srpsko-ruskog prijateljstva) laid wreaths at the Monument of Truth 
(Spomenik istine), located beside the main bridge over the river Ibar, and in the 
main square in Kosovska Mitrovica. The president of the provisional munici-
pality of Kosovska Mitrovica, Aleksandar Spirić, said that the consequences of 
the NATO bombing remained present to this day. Other officials stressed that 
it was a day to remember and that it could and should not ever be forgotten.
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